Discretionary Accounting for Loss Reserves in the Korean Property-Casualty Insurance Industry by Kim, Hojoong & Lee, Seokyoung
Discretionary Accounting for Loss Reserves in 
the Korean Property-Casualty Insurance Industry
Hojoong Kim*
Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea
Seok-Young Lee**
Sungshin Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
Abstract
This study examines whether property-casualty insurance companies
exercise accounting discretion when reporting the claim loss reserves,
in response to their financial strength. Specifically, we test if there is
evidence of directional overstatement or understatement in the original
loss reserves, in relation to financial strength measured by several
financial ratios and rating scores for each company prepared by the
insurance regulatory body’s financial scores. The study period includes
fiscal years 1993 through 1995, and takes measurements of reserve
error after two years of loss development. Empirical results provide
statistical evidence of a tendency for financially weak insurers to
understate the value of claim loss reserves while financially strong
insurers tend toward overvaluation of the reserves.
I. Introduction
Management’s potential to intentionally misstate the value of
property-casualty loss reserves has received considerable
attention in the United States. Anderson (1971), Smith (1980),
Weiss (1985), and Grace (1990) attempted to provide evidence of
systematic reserve errors in support of the income smoothing
hypothesis. Petroni (1992) and Penalva (1997) provided evidence
* College of Business Administration, Konkuk University
** Department of Management, Sung-Shin Women’s University
Seoul Journal of Business
Volume 9, Number 1 (December 2003)
of a tendency for financially weak U.S. insurers to understate
loss reserves in order to appear themselves financially sound.
Penalva (1997) also showed that financially strong insurers tend
to overstate loss reserves to mitigate taxes. More recently,
Petroni, Ryan and Whalen (1998) of fered evidence that
discretionary overstatements and understatements of loss
reserves are linked to future profitability, firm risk, and market
to book ratios. 
In contrast to the U.S. insurance market, investigations of the
loss reserving behavior of Korean property-casualty insurers are
relatively new. Kim, Lee and Son (1998) investigated loss reserve
reporting behavior in relation to insurers’ financial condition,
and provided evidence that insurers’ financial condition was
linked to a tendency toward understatement or overstatement of
the loss reserve. Specifically, they found that financially weaker
Korean insurers were more likely to understate loss reserves.
The exercise of management discretion in establishing the
value of the reserve reported in the insurer’s financial
statements is an issue of some importance. Intentional
overstatements of the reserve have the corresponding effect of
reducing reported income for the period by the same amount
disregarding taxes. Consequently, conclusions drawn from
commonly used profitability measures are potentially biased by
any intentional misstatements of reserve value. As the largest
component of insurer liabilities, loss reserves are central to the
analysis of insurer financial strength. Understatement of the
reserves translates directly into corresponding overstatements of
equity through an overstatement of policyholders’ surplus. This
one-to-one correspondence has the potential to bias many of the
financial ratios employed in the analysis of insurer financial
statements. The effects are particularly important with respect
to the evaluation of an insurer’s solvency margin, where
intentional reserve understatements will overstate the insurer’s
capital adequacy and can even obscure potential financial
distress.
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether the
tendency of Korean property-liability insurers to overstate or
underestimate the liability associated with future claims is a
function of the individual insurer’s financial strength. Ideally,
the degree of overstatement or understatement of the claim loss
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reserve can be accurately measured only after all claims are
reported and settled for insurance policies written as of a given
valuation date. In reality, however, loss reserves set aside for
certain long-tailed lines of insurance policies including bodily
injury and workers compensation are highly suspectible to
accurate estimation and only become clear as time passes.1)
Thus, the longer time span the loss development uses, the more
valid the measure of reserve error becomes.
This paper extends Kim, Lee and Son (1998) where limited
data required that reserve error be measured after only one year
of loss development, at which time about 50% of loss amounts
are realized. Here, we measure reserve error after two years of
loss development, at which time approximately 70 percent of
ultimate claims will have been settled. Thus, the measure of loss
reserve used in this paper is more valid than that of Kim, Lee
and Son (1998). It also extends the analysis period from two
years to three years starting 1993, and refine certain financial
condition variables affecting loss reserve reporting behavior.
Ideally, the reported claim loss reserve represents an insurer’s
best unbiased estimates of all amounts to be paid in satisfaction
of policyholders’ claims. In reality, the reported amount is an
estimate that is subject to future revision. With the passage of
time, additional information becomes available regarding the
losses attributable to policies written in prior periods, and
estimates of the incurred losses are revised to reflect the
emergence of this additional information. Amounts associated
with revised claim loss reserves are concurrently charged to
operations in a manner consistent with accounting for a ‘change
in accounting estimate.’ At any given financial statement date,
the difference between value of the reported reserve and the
value of the previously reported reserve provides a measure of
reserve error. This measurement method implies that the re-
estimated reserve amount is, in fact, correct with respect to the
ultimate amounts that will be paid.
This study measures reserve error using two years of loss
development. Kazenski, Feldhaus and Schneider (1992) have
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1) The losses attributable to insurance policies are chronologically incurred,
reported, settled, and finally paid. All losses not yet settled are subject to
estimation. The most uncertain element of loss reserves is that created by
losses which have been incurred but not reported(IBNR).
previously shown that a two to three year measurement horizon
was sufficient to detect statistically significant reserve errors
within samples of U.S. insurers. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our research
hypothesis. In section 3, we describe the sample data and
statistical methods used in our study. We present the empirical
results in section 4. Finally, we conclude in section 5 with a
summary and implications from this study.
II. Research Hypothesis
Solvency surveillance is one of the primary responsibilities of
insurance regulators. For insurers, maintaining the company’s
financial condition within regulatory requirements is of critical
importance. A weak financial profile can invite regulatory
intervention ranging from increased supervision to the
involuntary termination of operations and liquidation of the
enterprise. Given the potential costs of non-compliance,
managers of financially weak insurers have strong incentives to
maintain the appearance of financial solidity, particularly with
respect to regulatory minimum solvency margin requirements.
For example, Korean insurers were subject to a regulatory
constraint that limited the annual amount of net written
premiums up to 500 percent of its amount of the regulatory
solvency margin throughout the period under study.2)
Under-valuation of the claims reserve can be a particularly
effective tactic to avoid increased regulatory scrutiny and the
associated costs of compliance with above-normal regulatory
demands. The methods for establishing the value of the claims
loss reserves are complex, and require the exercise of
considerable professional judgment. Proper application of these
methods generally requires reliance on actuarial expertise.
Independent auditors charged with expressing an opinion on an
insurer’s financial statements are responsible for assessing the
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2) As of now, according to the Regulations on Supervision of Insurance
Business recently amended in August 2002 by Korean Financial Supervisory
Commission(FSC), if the solvency margin amount of an insurer is lower than
the regulatory solvency margin requirement, the insurer is subject to a
number of prompt corrective actions by the FSC.
reasonableness of the estimates, but are not required to validate
the details of the estimation process itself.
Based upon the foregoing, we argue that the presence of
solvency margin requirement regulation increases the benefits of
employing management discretion to understate the reported
reserves of financially weak insurers. This suggests, more
specifically, that management’s incentives to overstate the firm’s
solvency margin through intentional under-valuation of the
claims loss reserve is inversely related to the insurer’s financial
strength. This study focuses, therefore, on testing the following
hypothesis:
H1: Managers of financially weak property-casualty insurers
exhibit a bias toward understating estimates of claim loss
reserves, relative to managers of financially strong property-
casualty insurers.
III. Data and Statistical Methods
3.1. Data
This study uses the reserve error as a dependent variable that
is affected by an insurer’s financial strength. Financial strength
is partly proxied for by the Korean Insurance Supervisory
Board’s evaluation rating of property-casualty insurance firms
operating in Korea from 1993 to 1997.3) Other financial
statements variables are also used to represent financial
strength of insurers.
Data for this study are drawn from the financial reports of
Korean property-casualty insurance firms during the period
1993 through 1997. Defining reserve error as the difference
between the originally reported reserve and the re-estimated
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3) The Korean Insurance Supervisory Board is merged into the Koran Financial
Supervisory Commission (FSC) in April 1998, an integrated financial
institution supervisor in Korea, as a result of the 1997 financial crisis.
Further, the annual evaluation ratings previously made by the Board had
been replaced by the management performance evaluation system
established by the FSC, basically common to all types of financial
institutions, beginning 2000. This new management performance evaluation
system is sometimes called CAMEL (Capital, Asset, Management, Earnings,
and Liquidity).
reserve after two years of loss development permits the
calculation of reserve errors for each of the years 1993, 1994,
and 1995. Data collection excludes foreign insurers on the basis
that observed reserve behavior could be confounded by
regulations in force in the foreign insurer’s home country. Also
excluded from the analysis are insurers specializing in bond
guarantee or reinsurance.
Data concerning the originally reported reserve and the
reported value of the reserve two years later are collected to
provide the information necessary to construct the dependent
variable, reserve error or reserve deficiency. The measurement of
the reserve deficiency here is made for a fixed group of policies
as of original estimation date. For instance, the reserve
deficiency in 1997 is calculated for policies being written as of
the 1995 fiscal year-end.4)
In addition to the information necessary to calculate reserve
error, data on nine additional variables were collected. Four of
the variables relate to the Korean Insurance Supervisory Board’s
evaluations of individual insurers. The Board grades insurers’
overall financial condition and assigns a rating of AA (best), A, B,
or C to each insurer. This rating is a composite of scores along
four financial dimensions: growth, productivity, profitability, and
stability.5) For the purpose of this study, both the summary
class variables and the raw scores along each of the four
dimensions are used as independent variables in the analyses.
Five financial statements variables are also included as
independent variables in statistical analyses. These variables are
selected representing the financial condition of firms, typically
used in a bulk of financial distress literature. Four variables are
related to premiums, equity, expenses, and investments. Data
are collected in order to construct financial ratios. Finally,
insurer size is measured by total asset (billion Korean Won).
The operational definition for the dependent variable and each
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4) If during the two years the original and re-estimated reserves experience
changes as a result of policies being newly opened or expired, then the
reserve deficiency measure taken in this study may not reliably reflect the
management discretion.
5) The weights on each dimension are as follows; growth-5, productivity-10,
profitability-30, and stability-40. The remaining 15 point is given to the
publicity, the score of which for each insurer is determined by a committee.
of the financial statement independent variables is given in
Figure 1. The meaning of each variable is mostly self-
explanatory. The measure of reserve error, dependent variable in
this study, is constructed such that a positive value of reserve
error represents under-estimation of original loss reserve after
two years of loss development. The investment ratio variable and
premium-to-capital variable measure the return on investment
and the productivity of revenue generating activity relative to
capital amount, respectively. The loss ratio variable measures
what portion of insurance premium is paid or expected to be
paid for insurance claims. The expense ratio represents the
extent to which underwriting, maintenance, and collection
espenses are incurred in order to underwrite insurance
contracts, the main source of revenues for insurers.
Financial data on individual companies are taken from the
Insurance Statistics Yearbook. Additional qualitative and
quantitative data are taken from Insurers’ Annual Management
Evaluation Data prepared by the Korean Insurance Supervisory
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Note 1: Re-estimated Reserve = (remaining unpaid claim reserve +
claims paid to date) for a fixed group of policies as of the original
reserve estimation date.
Note 2: Earned premium, the sales figure for insurance company, is net
written premium subtracted by the increase in unearned
premium. Net written premium, in turn, is the premium income
minus premiums paid for reinsurance.
[1-(Original Reserve ÷ Re-estimated Reserve)] ×
100 (see note 1)
Investment Profit ÷ Invested Assets
Net Written Premiums ÷ (Paid-in Capital +
Policyholders’ Surplus)
Incurred Losses ÷ Earned Premium (see note 2)
Net Operating Expense ÷ Net Written Premiums
(see note 2)
Total Assets
Board. This latter source includes financial ratings based on
financial statement disclosures and supplemental data collected
by the Korean Insurance Supervisory Board.
In total, 33 observations are available for analysis. These
observations are taken on 11 Korean property-liability insurers
for each of the three years 1993 through 1995. Descriptive
statistics are provided in table 1, and Pearson correlation
coefficients are given in table 2.
The reserve error has a positive mean value of 3.62% with high
standard deviation, which indicates that property-casualty
insurance companies, on average, tend to understate the claim
loss reserve to appear themselves financially sound, with high
degree of variability across firms. The average return on
investment is 10.79%, and approximately 87% and 23% of
insurance premiums are paid for insurance claims and for
operating expenses, respectively. From the table 1, we can notice
one insurer has the capital impaired causing from the takeover
of a troubled automobile insurance company, resulting in the
negative value of premiums-to-capital variable.
By looking at the table 2, we can argue that the correlation
among explanatory variables are not serious, although certain
variables are highly correlated each other. We can notice that the
higher the profitability rating, the lower growth rating and the
higher the productivity rating. This relation implies some
insurers are somewhat selective in accepting new clients in
order to protect their profitability. It is plausible that the insurer
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable(unit or weight) Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
Reserve Error(%) 3.62 65.6 -30.1 20.73
Growth(5) 4.42 5.0 1.6 0.95
Productivity(10) 8.61 10.0 5.9 1.3
Profitability(30) 16.96 18.7 1.7 3.2
Stability(40) 23.01 37.0 12.0 7.12
Investment Ratio(%) 10.79 14.5 7.5 1.76
Premiums to Capital 9.31 43.04 -25.41 10.97
Loss Ratio(%) 87.41 109.7 76.5 7.75
Expense Ratio(%) 22.58 27.3 20.0 1.60
Size(billion Korean Won) 758 2,460 204 482
yielding high rate of return on investment receives high ratings
on productivity and profitability, as indicated by significantly
positive correlation of investment ratio with productivity and
profitability. Finally, it turns out that the larger the insurer, the
more financially strong it becomes. This conjecture is made by
observing the size variable is overall positively correlated with
sound financial indicators in table 2.
3.2. Statistical Methods
In order to provide a point of direct comparison to Kim, Lee
and Son (1998), the data are dichotomized into upper and lower
half, for each of the five financial ratio variables and the
summary ratings of insurers. The data for each variable are then
subjected to a t-test to determine if there are statistically
significant differences in the reserve error between the two
groups.
Preliminary analysis to determine the existence of a
statistically significant relationship between insurer financial
strength and reserve error is conducted using ANOVA. The
ANOVA analysis employs the class variables corresponding to
the Korean Insurance Supervisory Board’s summary rating of
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Produc- Investment Premium Loss Expense
Variable Profitability Stability Size
tivity Ratio To Capital Ratio Ratio
Growth -0.02 -0.40* 0.31 -0.15 0.12 -0.35* -0.29 0.31
Produc-
0.62* -0.22 0.36* 0.10 0.45* -0.20 0.27
tivity
Profit-
-0.24 0.46* 0.11 0.50* -0.05 0.02
ability
Stability 0.29 0.38 -0.59* 0.31 0.51*
Investment 









*: significant at 5% level.
the insurer (AA, A, B, or C) against the continuous reserve error
dependent variable.
Finally, a model is constructed that hypothesizes reserve error
to be a function of financial condition of insurers. This model is
subject to statistical test using a multiple linear regression
model, which includes the Supervisory Board ratings score for
each of four dimensions, rather than the summary ratings used
in the above ANOVA, in addition to five financial variables
presented above.
VI. Empirical Results
Differences in reserve error for each of the five financial ratios
and the Supervisory Board rating independent variables are
presented in Table 3. Again, each test involves dividing the data
into two groups of upper and lower half, and applying a t-test to
determine if the difference in observed reserve errors between
the two groups is statistically significant.
Table 3 shows that financial weak group for each of all
independent variables has generally higher reserve error than
financially strong group, although some variables showing
statistically not significant. The observed reserve error over two
year horizon differs significantly for two of the six variables,
investment ratio and the Insurance Supervisory Board rating. In
both cases, financially strong insurers tend toward reserve
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Table 3. t-Tests for Statistical Differences in Reserve Error, by Variable
Mean Reserve Error P-valueVariable
Financially Financially (H0: Means are 
Strong Weak equal)
Size (billion Korean Won) 3.32 3.95 0.93
Loss Ratio 2.83 4.37 0.84
Expense Ratio -0.99 8.53 0.19
Investment Ratio -3.99 11.71 0.03**
Premium to Capital 0.57 6.50 0.72
Supervisory Board Rating* -6.85 10.43 0.02**
*: Financially Strong rated AA or A, Financially Weak rated B or C
**: significant at 5% level
overstatement while financially weak insurers tend toward
reserve understatement. These results confirm those reported in
Kim, Lee and Son (1998).
Next, we examine the statistical relationship between observed
reserve error and the Korean Insurance Supervisory Board’s
company summary rating, using ANOVA. In contrast to the
dichotomized t-test reported above, this analysis uses the four
possible summary ratings (AA, A, B and C) as treatment levels.
The statistical results of this ANOVA analysis are reported in
Table 4.
This model confirms a statistically significant inverse
relationship between observed reserve error and insurer financial
strength as measured by the Supervisory Board’s summary
rating of the insurer. The model R2 of .41 is statistically
significant at less than 0.001 level of significance. This result
strongly implies that the loss reserve reporting behavior of
insurers is associated with the summary ratings made by the
Korean Insurance Supervisory Board based on which various
levels of regulatory intervention could be taken.
Finally, table 5 reports the parameter estimates, statistical
significance and summary model statistics resulting from the
estimation of the multiple regression model.6) With the exception
of the productivity, profitability, loss ratio and size, all variables
are statistically significant at α = .10 level. Though not apparent
due to rounding, size variable marginally fails the test of
significance at α = .10 with a p-value of 0.1029. With the
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Table 4. ANOVA Results for Reserve Error versus 4-Group Supervisory
Board Ratings
Sum of Mean
Source F Value P-value
Squares Square
Rating 5,635.32 1,878.44 6.71 0.00
Error 8,119.40 280.00
Totals 13,754.72
Reserve Error Mean: 3.62
R-Square: 0.4097
6) The model is also estimated including the year dummies to capture possible
year effects. The coefficients on these year dummies, though not presented
here, are not statistically significant.
exception of productivity and loss ratio, neither of which are
statistically significant, the signs of the regression coefficients
generally confirm expectations that financially weak insurers
tend to understate the loss reserve.
The insignificant, although negative as expected, result of the
coefficient for the profitability, one of Korean Insurance
Supervisory Board rating variables, may be due to the fact that
the model includes investment ratio and expense ratio, each of
which is related to the profitability dimension, and both of which
turn out to be statistically significant in the regression model. In
fact, although not reported here, the regression coefficient of
profitability turns out to be significantly negative with
investment ratio and expense ratio being excluded from the
regression model. This result indicates insurers with low
profitability in itself actually understate the loss reserves.
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Table 5. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results
Sum of Mean
Source F Value P-value
Squares Square








Intercept ? 283.03 69.84 0.00
Growth - -6.38 3.42 0.07*
Productivity - 2.23 2.86 0.45
Profitability - -0.81 1.21 0.51
Stability - -1.02 0.58 0.09*
Investment Ratio - -4.77 2.00 0.03*
Premiums to Capital + 0.88 0.27 0.00*
Loss Ratio + -0.67 0.51 0.31
Expense Ratio - -5.35 2.00 0.01*
Size ? -14.221×10-6 0.00 0.10
*: significant at 10% level.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This study provides statistical evidence that financially weak
Korean insurers exhibit a bias to understate their estimates of
claim loss reserves relative to financially strong insurers.
Analysis of variance confirms expectations that the tendency to
under-value claim loss reserves is greater for insurers receiving
lower (weaker) summary ratings from the Korean Insurance
Supervisory Board. Confirming evidence is provided by the
estimation of a multiple regression model that includes the
Supervisory Board’s ratings score in addition to five financial
variables relating the profitability and size. Year effects are found
to be not statistically significant.
These results generally confirm to those reported in studies of
insurer reserving behavior in the U.S. property-liability
insurance market. One major point of difference between this
study and those of U.S. insurers is the relative lack of loss
development data for Korean insurers. In the United States, both
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the
Securities and Exchange Commission require that ten years of
loss development data be provided in the financial statements
for total reserves and liability lines of insurance. Data for this
study was limited to two years of loss development, which may
affect the accuracy of the reserve error measurements used as
the dependent variable.
The results reported here are potentially important to
regulators. The presence of minimum solvency margin
requirements is intended to assure the integrity of the insurance
market and afford an additional measure of protection to
policyholders. However, regulatory constraints generate
incentives to bias the amounts reported in the financial
statements in order to avoid regulatory intervention. It is
conceivable that binding constraints may provide sufficient
incentives for a financially weak insurer to undertake inordinate
risks while masking its true financial condition through the use
of discretion in reporting its reserve estimates. In such a case,
the presence of overly restrictive regulation might actually
facilitate the financial failure that was originally intended to
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avoid.
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